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Over 65 cases were decided by Michigan courts during the
Survey period dealing with some aspect of property law. Most of
these cases raise property questions which are only incidental to
nonproperty issues and, as a result, will not be discussed in this
article. Similarly, those cases which have no precedential value,
restate old law, or confirm an established trend are not considered
worthy of discussion. Accordingly, in our judgment, only 16
property cases decided during the Survey period merit protracted
attention.
II. HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT
In City of Saginaw v. Budd,' the city, acting pursuant to an
ordinance which made a public ,nuisance of all buildings or
structures which are dangerous to human life or constitute a hazard
to safety or health or public welfare "by reason of inadequate
maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment .... "
sought an order directing the demolition of a house and garage
declared by the Inspectors' Division of the city to be a public
nuisance. Defendant contended that the ordinance lacked definable
standards, and challenged its constitutionality as an improper
exercise of the police power of the municipality, and as an improper
delegation of legislative authority to an administrative official
without precise standards to guide his actions. The court of
appeals affirmed the circuit court's finding that the ordinance was
valid on the basis that the terms "by reason of inadequate
maintenance, dilapidation" could scarely be made more specific,2
but the supreme court reversed, in a split decision, three judges
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.B.A. 1961, J.D. 1964, University of
Michigan.Dp.C.L. 1965. University of Stockholm.-ED.
t- Senior Member. Wayne Law'Review. B.A. 1967, Western Michigan University; J.D.
1970. Wayne State University.- ED.
1. 381 Mich. 173, 160 N.W.2d 906 (1968).
2. City of Saginaw v. Budd, 3 Mich. App. 681. 143 N.W.2d 608 (1966). revd. 381
Mich. 173. 160 N.W.2d 906 (1968).
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dissenting, stating that "the ordinance discloses that there was an
improper delegation . . . greater . . . than delegations we have
passed judgment upon and have declared unconstitutional in
previous opinions."'
The three cases relied upon by the majority in reaching its
holding provide questionable support for invalidating the Saginaw
ordinance. In Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores,4 the placement of
gas stations in a certain zoned area of the city was subject to
the exclusive discretion of the Zoning Board of Appeals. The
court noted in striking down the ordinance that "such an ordinance
becomes an open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready
tool for the suppression of competition through the granting of
authority to one and the withholding from another. ' 5 Similarly,
in Hoyt Brothers, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids,6 the court
overturned a grant of power to the city manager to license charitable
solicitation, where his only guidelines were whether he felt that the
charity was worthy and whether the solicitor was responsible. The
court found insufficient criteria for the city manager to follow in
determining what was a worthy charity and what was a responsible
person. In the third case cited, O'Brien v. State Highway
Commissioner,7 the court refused to uphold a statute giving the state
highway commissioner power to regulate roadside advertising
devices and requiring removal upon his determination that a sign
had a detrimental effect on the public safety, health, morals, and
welfare.
The majority's facile adoption in Budd of the holdings in these
cases without carefully analyzing their underlying rationale seems
to have resulted in the disregard of the ordinance's requirement
that the building be not only (1) inadequately maintained,
dilapidated, obsolete, or abandoned, but that it be also (2) hazardous
to safety, health, or public welfare because of this condition.
Reading clause (2) as delimiting clause (1) would seem to provide a
sufficiently defined building maintenance standard to be enforceable.
Past Michigan cases also bring into question the majority holding.
3. 381 Mich. 173, 178, 160 N.W.2d 906, 908 (1968).
4. 344 Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956):
5. Id. at 700, 75 N.W. 2d at 27.
6. 260 Mich. 447, 245 N.W. 509 (1932).
7. 375 Mich. 545, 134 N.W.2d 700 (1965).
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A literal reading of Budd would seem to invalidate the statutory
abatement of fire hazards under the Fire Prevention Act," which
withstood constitutional attack in Commissioner of State Police v.
Anderson.9 There, under a statute which gives the state police
commissioner power to order abatement where he finds that a
building, "by reason of want of repairs . . . or by reason of age or
dilapidated condition . ..may cause an otherwise preventable fire
. . . " the court found the building to be old and dilapidated but
refused to order its razing because it was not also hazardous to the
public. Anderson would seem to provide support for upholding the
ordinance in Budd. Moreover, cases from other jurisdictions, as
well,1' suggest that statutory schemes which are guided by the
necessity of danger to the public health, safety, and welfare are
sufficiently definite to weather constitutional challenge."
The validity of a legislative grant of power to a public official
or an administrative body is often said to depend upon the nature
of the matter to be regulated.' 2  Michigan authority exists for
8. MICH. Cosip. LAWS ANN. §§ 29.1-.25 (1967). This case would also suggest the
constitutional infirmity of part of the Dangerous Building Act, which defines a dangerous
building to be: "Whenever a building or structure used or intended to be used for dwelling
purposes, because of dilapidation, decay, damage or faulty construction or arrangement or
otherwise, is unsanitary or unfit for human habitation or is in a condition that is likely to
cause sickness or disease when so determined by the health officer, or is likely to work injury
to the health, safety or general welfare of those living within." Id. § 125.539(h) (Supp. 1970).
9. 344 Mich. 90, 73 N.W.2d 280 (1955).
10. Papaioanu v. Commissioners of Rehoboth, 25 Del. Ch. 327, 20 A.2d 447 (Ch.
1941); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957); Oursler v. Board
of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 397, 104 A.2d 568 (1954); Burnam v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
333 Mass. 114, 128 N.E.2d 772 (1955); Sellors v. Concord, 329 Mass. 259, 107 N.E.2d 784
(1952); Mirschel v. Weissenberger, 277 App. Div. 1039, 100 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't 1950);
Maxwell v. Klaess, 192 Misc. 939, 82 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1948); State
ar rel. Saveland Holding Corp., v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). In each of
these cases, the preamble or part of the statute in question refered to the public health, safety,
and welfare as the guiding principle, which the courts in turn construed this to temper the
exercise of the rest of the statute.
II. See Annots., 92 A.L.R. 400 (1934) (validity of statute or ordinance vesting
discretion in public officials without prescribing rule of action); 54 A.L.R. 1104 (1928) (same)i.,,
12 A.L.R. 1435 (1921) (attack on validity of a zoning statute, ordinance or regulation on
ground of improper delegation of authority to board or officer).
The constitutional power of state legislatures over the abatement of nuisances is outlined
in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 73 (1950)
(constitutional rights of owner as against destruction of building by public authorities).
12. Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1435 (1921) (validity of statute or ordinance vesting discretion
in public officials without prescribing a rule of action).
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relaxing the requirement of specific guidelines where the subject
matter of the regulation and its standard will permit less rigidity.
For example, the requirement that "good cause" be shown for the
revocation of a broker's license has been held to require no further
specificity.13 A broker's conduct which would constitute good cause
is thought to be commonly understood. The definition of "public
nuisance" as a condition which constitutes "a hazard to safety or
health, or public welfare, by reason of inadequate maintenance,
dilapidation, obsolesence, or abandonment," would seem to evoke a
similar common understanding. The use of the term "public
nuisance" itself, as is contained in the Saginaw ordinance, has had
the effect of curing an otherwise unconstitutionally vague statute4 in
another jurisdiction.
S111. ZONING
A zoning ordinance must have a reasonable connection with
public health, safety, and welfare to limit a private property owner's
use of his land,' 5 or the ordinance is unconstitutional and void." The
supreme court, in the leading case of Brae Burn, Inc. v. City of
Bloomfield Hills, annunciated the refusal of Michigan courts to act
as a superzoning board and emphasized the doubtful propriety of
frequent judicial review of zoning cases, which the court saw as
inconsistent with the separation of judicial and administrative
powers.
13. G.F. Redmond & Co. v. Michigan Sec. Comm'n, 222 Mich. I, 192 N.W. 688
(1923).
14, See Phillips Petrolium Co. v. Anderson. 74 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954).
15. Padover v. Township of Farmington. 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Roll
v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963); Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy.
367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962); Bzovi v. City of Livonia. 350 Mich. 489, 87 N.W.2d
110 (1958); McHugh v. City of Dearborn, 348 Mich. 311. 83 N.W.2d 222 (1957); Bassey v.
City of Huntington Woods, 344 Mich. 701, 74 N.W.2d 897 (1956); Penning v. Owens, 340
Mich. 355.65 N.W.2d 831 (1954).
16. Legislation bearing no relation to the public health, safety, and welfare goes beyond
the constitutional police power of the state. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 272 U.S.
365 (1926). A zoning ordinance which deprives the landowner of any use for which his land
is suited is invalid as confiscatory and violates the due process and equal protection clauses.
Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich. 28, 116 N.W.2d 53 (1962); Burrell v. City of Midland.
365 Mich. 136, Ill N.W.2d 884 (1961); Long v. City of Highland Park. 329 Mich. 146, 45
N.W.2d 10 (1950); Brandau v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 5 Mich. App. 297, 146 N.W.2d
695 (1966).
17. 350 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957).
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In Brae Burn the supreme court seemed to require that more
than a debatable question of an ordinance's reasonableness be raised
before court review would be appropriate. Perhaps more
importantly, the court evidenced the attitude that no significant
justicable issue is presented in the ordinary case involving merely an
unwise zoning plan, as opposed to a zoning plan which is completely
unreasonable and thus confiscatory.' After the Brae Burn test was
annunciated, however, the court became reluctant to follow
its standard-a fact that led one practitioner to declare the test
impliedly overruled. 9 By the early 1960's the court seemed to be
acting once again as a superzoning board.2 °
Cases decided by the three divisions of the court of appeals
during the Survey period indicate an attitude which harks back to
the stricter standard of Brae Burn. In Kraus v. City of Royal Oak,2'
the plaintiff attacked a zoning ordinance by showing that existing
circumstances made the logical use of his property conflict with its
single-family residential zoning classification. He argued that the
mixed character of the neighborhood, nearby busy highways, a
substantial disparity in value between the desired use and the zoned
use, the presence of nearby railroad tracks, and the consequent
withdrawal of FHA financing for proposed housing made
application of the zoning ordinance unreasonable. The court of
appeals, second division, however, upheld the ordinance, noting that
in order to sustain an attack on a zoning ordinance, proof of the
disparity in value must be "accompanied by other factors which
clearly affect the public health, safety or general welfare of the
people. 212 The court noted further that plaintiff had failed "to
adequately cope with most of the public interest considerations
which . . . prompted the adoption of the zoning ordinance." 3 In
18. Andrews, What Ever Happened to the Brae Burn Rule?, 43 MICH. ST. B.J. 34
(March 1964).
19. Id.
20. No Michigan case presented with this issue invalidated a local ordinance on the
basis of the Brae Burn rule from 1961 until 1963. Smith v. Village of Wood Creek Farms,
371 Mich. 127, 123 N.W.2d 210 (1963); Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d
899 (1963). Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962);
Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich. 28, 116 N.W.2d 53 (1962); Wenner v. City of
Southfield, 365 Mich. 563, 113 N.W.2d 918 (1962); Burrell v. City of Midland, 365 Mich.
136, 11I N.W.2d 884 (1961).
21. II Mich. App. 183, 160 N.W.2d 769 (1968).
22, Id. at 191, 160 N.W.2d at 772.
23. Id. at 191,160 N.W.2d at 772-73.
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Yale Development Co. v. City of Portage,24 the court of appeals,
third division, found that adjacent busy roads, the difficulty in
obtaining financing for the property as zoned, the lack of demand
for the property as zoned, and a substantial disparity in the value
of the property with and without the zoning restriction presented no
more than a debatable question. The court of appeals, first division,
used the strictest approach, however, in Brandau v. City of Grosse
Pointe Park !5 The plaintiffs claimed that because the surrounding
land was zoned for an inconsistent use, the value of their land was
destroyed as zoned. The court held that this did not "conclusively
[establish] that [the plaintiffs] could not reasonably use their
property as zoned. ' 2' The court suggested that in order to have
standing to raise the issue, the plaintiff must have attempted to use
or sell his property for the zoned use or have shown that attempts
to do so would be useless. Ii the four other cases in which the courts
of appeals discussed the validity of the application of a zoning
ordinance, they uniformly upheld the ordinances'
The above cases indicate that the various divisions of the court
of appeals may be developing a stricter standard with regard to
overturning the proposed application of a zoning ordinance.28 The
implication for the practitioner is that he may no longer enjoy the
same success in attacking local zoning ordinances in the courts. His
most effective avenue for relief may be increasingly with the local
legislature which adopted the plan or the local zoning board of
appeals which implements it.
The Michigan Supreme Court, on the other hand, in Biske v.
24. 11 Mich. App. 83, 160 N.W.2d 604 (1968).
25. 15 Mich. App. 689, 167 N.W.2d 366 (1969).
26. Id. at 692, 167 N.W.2d at 367.
27. Shackett v. Township of Highland, 15 Mich. App. 543, 166 N.W.2d 821 (1969)
(ordinance which barred trailer parks may still be reasonable); Bihlmire v. Lake Township,
16 Mich. App. 633, 168 N.W.2d 437 (1969) (township has standing to enforce a valid zoning
ordinance); Rottman v. Township of Waterford, 13 Mich. App. 271, 164 N.W.2d 409 (1968)
(fact that no vacant land was zoned for use as a trailer park not unreasonable because other
land was zoned for a trailer park and actually so used); Nosal v. City of Lansing, 14 Mich.
App. 733, 165 N.W.2d 926 (1968) (plaintiff failed to rebut presumption of reasonableness).
28. For example, compare the weight given to the fact that the FHA had refused to
finance develpment of the property as zoned in Wenner v. City of Southfield, 365 Mich. 563,
113 N.W.2d 918 (1962); Burrell v. City of Midland, 365 Mich. 136, II1 N.W.2d 884 (1961),
with the weight given the same factor in the Survey cases of Kraus v. City of Royal Oak, I I
Mich. App. 183, 160 N.W.2d 769 (1968); Yale Dev. Co. v. City of Portage, II Mich. App.
83, 160 N.W.2d 604 (1968).
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City of Troy,29 upheld plaintiff's attack on a zoning ordinance
because the court found that the ordinance had no substantial
relation to present public welfare. The ordinance was adopted by the
city pursuant to an elaborate master plan which anticipated
dramatic future growth. Plaintiff alleged that his right to the free use
of his property could not be restricted by such speculative standards.
The supreme court, reversing the court of appeals, second division,
held that the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance must be tested
with respect to existing facts and conditions, "not some condition
which might exist in the future."30
Although there is a recognized difference between the function
of a zoning ordinance in a settled and developed urban area and that
in a growing suburban area,3' the Michigan Supreme Court has
closely regulated city planners by consistently invalidating zoning
ordinances enacted to limit residential lot size and population
density in rapidly developing areas.3 2 The court has stressed the
connection between the ordinance and present public welfare in spite
of statutes which seem to authorize such future planning33 and the
reasoning of dissenting judges and cases in other jurisdictions which
have allowed much more extreme measures to stand. 4
It has been argued that planning in a rapidly growing urban
area cannot be judged by the standards used to determine the
reasonableness of zoning ordinances in settled areas.35 Such an
approach is unrealistic and has the practical effect of frustrating all
29. 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969), rev'g 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899
(1967).
30. Id. at617, 166 N.W.2d at 457.
31. Note, Zoning: Permissible Purposes, 50 CoLu.nn. L. REV. 202 (1950); Comment,
Building Size, Shape, and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning Reexamined, 60 YALE
L.J. 506 (1951); 62 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1963).
32. Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Roll
v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963); Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy,
367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962); Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Redford Township Bldg.
Inspector, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946); Senefsky v. City of Huntington Woods,
307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943).
33. MICH. Cotp. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.37, .581 (1967).
34. Dilliard v. Village of North Hills, 279 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d Dep't
1950) (two-acre minimum lot size upheld); Thompson v. City of Carrollton, 211 S.W.2d 970.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
35. Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 641-43, 132 N.W.2d 687, 696-




city planning. On the other hand, however, the danger of a rule
which allows speculative planning without regard to present
conditions is equally clear. "[T]he hapless property owner waits,
pays taxes and hopes that either the anticipated development will
come shortly or that the zoning authority will release to some extent
its griphold of his property right." 6 The defect which may exist in
the court's approach in Biske is that when the connection between
an ordinance and the public need is examined in cases involving long
range plans, it cannot be judged by the same reasonableness test
which was formulated to deal with the constitutionality of urban
zoning. One must look at what the city is empowered to do and to
what the ordinance is designed to accomplish in determining the
reasonableness of the ordinance.37 Although community planners
require an initial indulgence, they must make realistic projections
based upon existing facts, since such facts, in turn, will be analyzed
by the courts in judging the reasonableness of their projections.
IV. LANDLORD & TENANT
The court of appeals decided five cases covering the landlord-
tenant relationship, three of which are of special interest.3 , In
Newkirk v. Millman Brothers, Inc.,3 1 the parties in 1959 entered into
a fifteen-year lease at a monthly rental of $800. In 1963 the parties
allegedly amended the lease to reduce rent payments to $600 per
month. Thereafter, the reduced payments were accepted by plaintiff
until 1967 when he returned two $600 rent checks covering May and
June and sued for the original contract rent for those two months.
The trial court, without deciding whether plaintiff had actually
promised to reduce the rent, held that any such promise would be
unenforceable for lack of consideration. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that defendant's undertaking to remain in
possession of the premises (which undertaking was not an expressed
part of the original lease) constituted sufficient consideration to
support such a promise by plaintiff.
36. Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611,617, 166 N.W.2d 453, 458 (1969).
37. Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 641, 132 N.W.2d 687. 696
(1965).
38. Two cases are not discussed because of the essentially factual nature of the issues
presented. Clouse v. Nuffer, 13 Mich. App. 640, 164 N.W.2d 737 (1968); Frandora Realty,
Inc. v. Grinnel Bros., Inc., 15 Mich. App. 217, 166 N.W.2d 511 (1968).
39. 16 Mich. App. 306, 167 N.W.2d 854 (1969).
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This case is the third in a series of recent cases dealing with the
enforceability of agreements to reduce rent during the term of a
lease. The majority of jurisdictions, following classic contract
principles, refuse to uphold modifications of a lease based upon a
subsequent expressed undertaking by the lessee to stay in possession
upon the rationale that such modifications are not supported by
consideration. 0 A substantial minority of jurisdictions, on the other
hand, led by the 1897 case of Hynan v. Jockey Club Wine, Liquor
& Cigar Co.," adopt the opposing view. Early treatise writers"
criticized H,man on the ground that it was misleading in failing to
distinguish between a situation where the lessee, in the absence of a
prior undertaking, affirmatively promises to stay in actual
possession of the leased premises and where he merely promises to
forego breaching the lease. Theoretically, in the absence of an
expressed agreement, the lessee has no affirmative duty to occupy the
premises; his only duty is to pay the agreed rent. His undertaking
to specifically occupy the premises, therefore, constitutes a new
independent commitment which provides sufficient consideration to
support the lessor's promise of a rent reduction. Michigan follows
Hi*inan. Thus, in Eisenberg v. C.F. Battenfeld Oil Co., 3 where the
lessee found the business operated under a ten-year lease inadequate
to pay the stipulated rent, the court enforced the lessor's agreement
to reduce the rent for the balance of the term. According to the
court, consideration for the agreement could be found in the promise
of the lessee to continue to occupy the premises (citing Hyman). The
court of appeals has recently affirmed this position in Minor-
Dietiker v. Mar, Jane Stores" and Green v. Milman Brothers,
Inc.,1' although in the latter case the court held that the lessee's
promise not to vacate did not constitute new consideration, in light
of the lessee's original undertaking to operate 100 percent of the
leased premises. Despite the criticism that such a distinction verges
on the metaphysical and that the alleged consideration is rarely
40. See Annots.. 93 A.L.R. 1404, 1406 (1934); 46 A.L.R. 1518 (1927); 43 A.L.R. 1451
(1926).
41. 9 Colo. App. 299,48 P. 671 (1897).
42. 3 H. TIFFANY. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 890. at 547 (3d ed. 1939).
43. 251 Mich. 654. 232 N.W. 386 (1930).
44. 2 Mich. App. 585. 141 NW.2d 342 (1966).
45, 7 Mich. App. 450. 151 N, W.2d 860 (1967).
1970]
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
actually bargained for, 6 the principal case affirms Michigan's
acceptance of the minority view.
Several cases in other jurisdictions reach the same result but on
different grounds. In those instances in which the lessee will be
forced out of business unless the rent is reduced, courts have
enforced a lessor's promise to lower the rent when it is made to
induce the lessee to continue in business.47 The Michigan legislature
by statute has supported enforcement of such promises in those
instances involving a written agreement in providing that "[a]n
agreement shall not be invalid because of the absence of
consideration where it is represented by a writing."48
In Paisley v. United Parcel Service, Inc.," a truck owned by
defendant, United Parcel Service, Inc., struck plaintiff's daughter as
it was being driven across a gas station parking lot. The defendant
filed a third party complaint against the owner of the gas station,
Gulf Oil Corporation, and its lessee, Holtz, seeking contribution
from them as joint tortfeasors. United alleged that Gulf knew
children played in the parking lot and that this represented a
nuisance for which the owner of leased property could be liable even
though he exercised no control over the lessee's use of the property.
The court of appeals denied United's request for contribution,
holding that Gulf would be liable only for dangerous conditions
existing at the time the lease was executed, a circumstance that must
be alleged to impose liability against Gulf.
In order to hold the owner of leased property liable for
damages incurred upon his land, plaintiff must show that the owner
has control over the premises or, under the holding of Bluemer v.
Saginaw Central Oil & Gas Service, Inc.,50 that the injurious
instrumentality existed and constituted a nuisance at the time the
lease was executed. In Bluenier the requirement that the dangerous
condition exist at the time of execution is implicit while in Paisley'
it is expressed. Nuisance has been characterized as "the great grab
bag, the dust bin, of the law.'"5t.Equitably, there would seem to be
46. Bartke & Callahan, Real and Personal Property. 1968 Ann. Survey of Afich. Law,
15 WAYNE L. REv. 397,411 (1968).
47. Parrish v. Haynes, 62 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1932) (dictum); William Lindeke Land Co.
v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934).
48. MICH. Co~tp. LAws ANN. § 566.1 (1967).
49. 14 Mich. App. 301, 165 N.W.2d 299 (1968).
50. 356 Mich. 399, 96 N.W.2d 90 (1959).
51. Awad v. McColgan, 357 Mich. 386,389,98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (1959).
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justification for limiting its application to dangerous conditions
which the defendant had a direct opp6rtunity to control or eliminate.
By limiting the scope of the lessor's liability for nuisances arising
from the use of the premises to damage caused by inherently
dangerous conditions of the property existing at the time of
execution of the lease, the effect of Bluemer and cases following its
holding, including Paisley, has been to strike a balance between a
policy against allowing a landowner to insulate himself from liability
for an inherently dangerous condition and one against permitting
recovery from a lessor when he is essentially blameless.
The third landlord-tenant case of interest decided by the court
of appeals was Hull v. Detroit Equipment Installation, Inc." Suit
was brought against the lessor to recover increased sewage charges
assessed by the City of Keego Harbor which were occasioned by the
plaintiff's use of the premises as a laundromat. The lease was silent
on the question of who would bear increased sewage charges. The
court held the lessee liable for the increased charges, reasoning that
because such an increase was due to the lessee's increased use of the
land, it would be senseless to require the lessor to pay for the lessee's
success. The court relied almost exclusively on cases which have
dealt with liability for increased tax assessments due to the lessee's
improvments in the leasehold. The general rule with regard to the
payment of taxes on leased property, where the lease is silent on the
issue, is that the lessor is liable 3 The justification for the rule is that
one who receives the rents and profits from land should bear the
correlative tax burden. The court in the principal case cited Wycoff
v. Gavriloff Motors, Inc.,54 as establishing the controlling exception
to this principle-that the burden of taxes on "removable"
improvements is on the lessee. In determining whether improvments
are removable, courts have established the guideline that, if the
improvement primarily benefits the lessee and is in furtherance of the
purposes of the lease, the improvements are considered the personal
property of the lessee and "removable" by him rather than a
"permanent fixture" which will revert to the lessor.55 Two other
relevant considerations often weighed are: the length of the term of
52. 12 Mich. App. 532, 163 N.W.2d 271 (1968).
53. Annots., 86 A.L.R.2d 663 (1962); 73 A.L.R. 824 (1931).
54. 362 Mich. 582, 107 N.W.2d 820 (1961).
55. 3A G. THOMPSON. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1377 (4th ed. 1959).
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the lease and whether the lessee is compensated for the improvement
on the leased property. The principal case appears to be the first in
Michigan to expand this concept to cases where the increased taxes
are due to the lessee's increased use of the land. The closest case
factually is a New York case, New York University v. American
Book Co.,56 where the defendant-lessee was held liable for water
assessments which were levied by the city according to actual
consumption. The principal case finds analogous support in the
rationale underlying the improvement cases-the benefit upon which
the tax is based enures to the lessee and, therefore, in the absence of
agreement otherwise, he should bear the increased tax obligation as
well.
Michigan was moved into the forefront of housing legislation
by new landlord-tenant legislation which took effect in 196877
Basically, the legislation provides for expanded personal rights
of action by the tenant under the housing code, grants the tenant
previously unavailable defenses in the landlord's action for
possession, and imposes a statutory warranty of habitability upon
leases for a term of less than one year. This Survey article will not
attempt an extended discussion of the new law since it is adequately
discussed in a comment published in volume 15, issue number two
of the Wayne Law Review 8
V. FORECLOSURE
The proper exercise of the right of redemption in connection
with foreclosure under a land contract was examined by the court
during the Survey period. In Gordon Grossman Building Co. v.
Elliot,59 defendant and her husband, vendees under a land contract
with plaintiff, defaulted in their payments and in November 1966
plaintiff obtained a judgment of foreclosure. The property was sold
to plaintiff at a commissioner's sale in December 1966, and in
February 1967 an order confirming the sale was entered. Defendant
56. 197 N.Y. 294,90 N.E. 819 (1910).
57. MICH. CoNip. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.401-.519, 554.139, 660.5634. .5637, .5646, .5670
(Supp. 1968). Also enacted in the same legislative session were laws dealing with public
housing. Id. §§ 125.644(a)-(b), .649-.655 (Siipp. 1968).
58. Comment, The New Michigan Landlord-Tenant Law: Partial Answer to a
Perplexing Problem, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 836 (1969).




alleged that thereafter, during the period of redemption, she made
arrangements to sell the property. In connection with the sale, a
financing bank approved the issuance of a mortgage to defendant's
vendee two weeks before the expiration of the redemption period and
asked that the defendant obtain a warranty deed from plaintiff in
order to "facilitate" the handling of the mortgage. A warranty deed
was prepared by defendant and forwarded to plaintiff's attorney with
the request that plaintiff deliver it to the bank to be held in escrow
pending disbursement of sufficient funds to cover plaintiffs interest.
Plaintiff's attorney refused to comply on the basis that such an
arrangement lacked the necessary tender to effectuate redemption.
As a result, defendant's period of redemption expired. The court of
appeals upheld the trial court's order directing plaintiff to deliver the
deed to defendant on the basis that defendant had made sufficient
legal tender.
Although the rule with respect to tenders is often harshly stated
to require an unconditional offer coupled with actual, present ability
to pay, 0 as early as 1902 the rule was described as flexible.6 An
unconditional offer, however, requires something more than a mere
statement that "arrangements have been completed to raise the
money necessary. '62 In this connection, several Michigan cases have
held that requesting a deed at the time of tender makes the tender
defective." Further, the rule has been held unsatisfied by a mere
showing that the vendee has an apparent ability to pay-his ability
must be actual and present." Measured against previous cases in this
area, the principal case would seem to follow a more relaxed
requirement. The court has apparently balanced what is, in its
judgment, a remote possibility that plaintiff will not forthwith
receive full payment for its interest in the property against the
burden, and possible forfeiture, which may result to defendant if her
resale is not facilitated. The court observed that in the context of the
principal case plaintiff's requirement of strict tender does not
60. Kaiser. v. Weber, 301 Mich. 609, 4 N.W.2d 29 (1942); Chase v. Welsh, 45 Mich.
345, 7 N.W. 895 (1881).
61. Niederhauser v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 131 Mich. 550, 91 N.W. 1028 (1902).
62. Kaiser v. Weber, 301 Mich. 609, 613, 4 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1942).
63. Id; cf. Johnson v. Cranage, 45 Mich. 14, 7 N.W. 188 (1880).
64. Duiven v. Brakesman, 356 Mich. 1, 95 N.W.2d 868 (1959); Friedman v. Winshall,
343 Mich. 647, 73 N.W.2d 248 (1950); Niederhauser v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 131 Mich.
500.91 N.W. 1028 (1902).
1970]
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
recognize "the commercial exigencies of the day and particularly
does not reflect land contract custom and usage."65
A vendee under a land contract, in attempting to realize full
value with respect to his redemption right, may be required to
convey legal title to a subsequent purchaser, rather than his mere
contractual interest. Consider, for example, a situation where the
vendee's period of redemption is about to run, as in the principal
case, or where the vendee's rights under the land contract are
nonassignable.66 A subsequent purchaser and his prospective
mortgagee will be loath to deliver the purchase price to the vendee
without complete assurance that a deed conveying legal title to the
property will be delivered in return. Under an escrow arrangement
the subsequent sale is facilitated by the assurance that the vendor of
the land contract cannot revoke the deed at will 7 or its delivery on
grounds inconsistent with the arrangement. s Without financing
realized in connection with the subsequent sale, the vendee may be
effectively precluded from exercising his right of redemption.
If the escrow period does not exceed the period of redemption
and the escrow agent is responsible, delivery of a deed to an escrow
agent upon the understanding that it will be conveyed to the vendee
in return for full payment of the vendor's interest would seem to
impose no significant detriment to the vendor. The vendor retains
legal title under such an arrangement,69 until the escrow conditions
are met (full payment of the vendor's interest, prior to termination
65. Gordon Grossman Bldg. Co. v. Elliot, II Mich. App. 620, 625, 162 N.W.2d 107,
109 (1968).
66. Generally, such restrictions upon an absolute estate are void as retraints on
alienation because they are repugnant to the grant and violation of the restriction effects only
the vendee's interest. Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955). In the case of
land contracts, however, the vendor may validly provide that the vendee's interest shall not
be assignable without his consent to protect his security. Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich. 372,
242 N.W. 735 (1932). Generally, this restriction is valid only between the vendor and vendee.
Its breach may be raised by the vendor. Vande Vooren v. McCall, 360 Mich. 199, 103 N.W.2d
350 (1960). It is valid only while the vendor retains an interest. Lotesky v. Davis, 355 Mich.
536, 94 N.W.2d 796 (1959); see Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1361 (1944). See generally Annot., 42
A.L.R.2d 1243 (1955).
67. Ripley v. Lucas, 267 Mich. 682, 255 N.W. 356 (1934).
68. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 147 Mich. 365, 110 N.W. 960 (1907).
69. Frankiewicz v. Konwinski, 246 Mich. 473, 224 N.W. 368 (1929); Muirhead v.
McCullough, 234 Mich. 52, 207 N.W. 886 (1926); 8 G. THOMPSON. THE LAW Or REAL
PROPERTY § 4244, at 143 (4th ed. 1963); 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1053, at 244 (3d ed. 1939).
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of the escrow arrangement). However, if the vendor's interest ex-
ceeds in value the vendee's resale price, the vendee clearly should be
required to satisfy the rule with regard to the difference before the
vendor is required to enter into the escrow arrangement.
It has been noted that a realistic right to redemption is one of
the safeguards against potential hardship "and miscarriage of justice
which may result from the vendor bidding in the property for less
than its real value and then holding the purchaser for the deficiency
which is thus fixed at an exhorbitant figure."70 To require the vendee
in the context of the principal case to tender the full purchase price
as a condition to the vendor's delivery of his deed into escrow would
seem to be commercially unreasonable.
Another foreclosure case decided during the Survey period is
Dumas v. Helm.71 The defendant purchased property on a land
contract and on several occasions fell behind in payments. The court
of appeals noted that plaintiff had instituted several circuit court
commissioner's forfeiture actions and a forfeiture action in the
circuit court itself, but each time the defendant had been allowed to
make up the payments. Although the land contract had an
acceleration clause which the vendor pressed in the action, the circuit
court had ruled that the defendant, notwithstanding the acceleration
clause, could make up the defaulted installment payments and denied
the plaintiffs foreclosure. On appeal, the court of appeals held that
the circuit court had no discretion to deny enforcement of an
acceleration clause properly invoked, and ordered the entry of a
judgment of foreclosure. The defendant, the court observed, could
obtain equitable relief through the exercise of his right of
redemption.
This decision, in part, involved the construction of section 3110
of the Revised Judicature Act,72 requiring that a complaint for
foreclosure be dismissed where the vendee brings into court the
principal and interest due in situations where "there is due any
interest or any portion or installment of the principal and there are
any other portions or installments to become due subsequently
70. Durfee & Duffy, Foreclosure of Land Contracts in Michigan: Equitable Suit and
Suntntary Proceedings, 7 MICH. ST. B.J. 166, 183 (1928).
71. 15 Mich. App. 148, 166 N.W.2d 306 (1968).
72. Mic,. Com:p. LAWS ANN. § 600.3110 (1968).
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. . . ." The Committee Comment to section 3110 states that the
effect of the above quoted clause makes the section inapplicable in
the face of a properly invoked acceleration clause. The court adopts
this interpretation. Absent the operation of section 3110, defendant's
default is governed by Michigan contract law, which enforces
acceleration clauses,73 even though there are Michigan decisions
specifically holding that such clauses constitute a form of penalty.74
In conformity with past precedent the court accurately observed that
the circuit court has never been held to possess judicial discretion
where an acceleration clause is properly raised,75 unless default has
been induced by the unconscionable conduct of the vendor or is the
result of a good faith dispute as to liability.76 The facts of the
principal case might be viewed as persuasive support for those
advocating the enforcement of acceleration clauses; the vendees had
defaulted and suffered foreclosure at least four times in four years.
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN
Two cases during the Survey period concerned the construction
of the public utilities condemnation statute in light of the revised
approach to condemnation contained in the 1963 Michigan
Constitution, which, inter alia, changed a condemnation suit from
an inquisitorial to an adversary proceeding. In Detroit Edison Co.
v. Zoner,77 defendant appealed the denial by the probate court of his
73.- Young v. Zavitz, 365 Mich. 354, 112 N.W.2d 493 (1961); Brody v. Crozier, 242
Mich. 660, 219 N.W. 643 (1928); Jaarde v. Van Ommen, 265 Mich. 673, 252 N.W. 485
(1934); Rathje v. Siegel, 243 Mich. 376, 220 N.W. 658 (1928); Wilcox v. Allen, 36 Mich. 160
(1877).
74. Rathje v. Siegel, 243 Mich. 376, 220 N.W. 658 (1928); Wilcox v. Allen, 36 Mich.
160, 169 (1877); ("This clause is in the nature of a forefeiture or penalty. Its object is to punish
for a willful neglect of a clear duty . . ."). The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions enforce
acceleration clauses, but do not regard them as a penalty. Federal Land Bank v. Wilmarth,
218 Iowa 339, 252 N.W. 507 (1934); Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. I. 171 N.E. 884
(1930); Luke v. Patterson, 192 Okla. 631, 139 P.2d 175 (1943); Fant v.Thomas, 131 Va. 38,
108 S.E. 847 (1929).
75. Brody v. Crozier, 242 Mich. 660, 219 N.W.2d 643 (1928); Larson v. Pittman. 3
Mich. App. 348, 142 N.W.2d 479 (1966).
76. Jaarda v. Van Ommen, 265 Mich. 673, 252 N.W. 485 (1934) (unconscionable
conduct of a vendor); Ratbje v. Siegel, 243 Mich. 376, 220 N.W. 658 (1928) (good faith dispute
as to amount due); Wilcox v. Allen, 36 Mich. 160 (1877) (good faith dispute as to amount
due).
77. 12 Mich. App. 612, 163 N.W.2d 496 (1968). This case also presentd a substantial




request for a formal pretrial conference. The second division of the
court of appeals determined that Michigan General Court Rule
301.1, requiring a pretrial conference in every "contested civil
action," did not generally apply to probate court proceedings.78 This
decision would seem to conflict with the first division's holding in
State Highway Commissioner v. Lindow, 79 that under a statute
permitting the condemnation proceeding to be brought in either
circuit court or probate court,8 a condemnation suit is "contested
civil action" within rule 301.1. The first division based its decision
upon the nature and function of a pretrial conference, in light of the
new adversary nature of condemnation cases generally, without
distinguishing between those cases brought in circuit and in probate
court. Although the Comment to General Court Rule 301.1 would
make the rule inapplicable to condemnation cases, it would do so
on the basis that such cases are inquisitorial proceedings .8  The
principal case limits the holding in State Highway Commissioner v.
Lindow to those condemnation cases brought in circuit court. The
court may have been influenced, in part, by the apparent use by
defendant of the pretrial objection as a makeweight. According to
the court, an informal pretrial conference was held (perhaps one
without the requirements of General Court Rule 301.1) and the
defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by its
informal nature. The growing role of the probate court as an
adversary tribunal, the changed complexion of condemnation cases,
and the function of pretrial conferences to facilitate court
administration seems to militate against the second division's
decision in the principal case. Clearly, there is no distinguishing
78. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 301 (1963) provides: "In every contested civil action the court
shall direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference ....
79. 4 Nich. App. 496, 145 N. V.2d223 (1966).
80. The Lindow case did not specify the statute under which that case was brought but
it appears that under either MICH. CoP. LAWS ANN. § 224.12 (1967) (the provision under
which both state and county road commissioners proceed) or MICH. Co.ip. LAWS
ANN. § 213.177 (1967) (the general condemnation statute) a petition may be filed in either
"the circuit court or the probate court of the county ....
81. "A condemnation proceeding constitutes an inquest and not a 'contested' action;
therefore, Rule 301 would not apply to condemnation cases. . . . The purpose of the pretrial
conference is to arrive at a conclusion which will control the subsequent hearing, but the
pretrial conference cannot accomplish this purpose in a condemnation case since the court does
not control the condemnation hearing in the same sense that it controls a civil action." MICH.
GEN. CT. R. 301, Committee Notes at 5 (1963).
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characteristic between condemnation cases brought in circuit court
and those in probate court which would warrant a double standard.
By following the lead of State Highway Commissioner v. Lindow
and holding that a probate court condemnation proceeding is a
"contested civil action," rule 301.1 could be held to apply to the
probate court through General Court Rule 11.2.82 Although it found
defendant had not been prejudiced in the action because an informal
pretrial conference had been held, the court still might have adopted
a requirement of future pretrial conferences while denying the
defendant's appeal in the principal caseyt
In Chamberlin v. Detroit. Edison Co.' the plaintiff challenged
a condemnation proceeding under the public utilities condemnation
statute on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional in light
of the requirements of the 1963 Constitution. The case required the
court of appeals, second division, to review the basic changes in
condemnation proceedings made by the 1963 Constitution-the
elimination of the condemnation "jury" and the change in the
nature of the proceeding from an inquisitorial to an adversary
action.86 The construction of General Court Rule 516.587 and the
supreme court's attempt to remold the old condemnation statutes so
as to conform to the constitutional mandate, controlled the
disposition of the case. The plaintiff argued that the General Court
Rules were not applicable to the probate court. Adopting a posture
82. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 11.2 (1963) provides: "Rules which are by their terms applicable
to other courts shall apply to those courts."
83. Cf. State Highway Comm'n v. Gulf Oil Corp., 377 Mich. 309, 140 N.W.2d 500
(1966).
84. 14 Mich. App. 565, 165 N.W.2d 845 (1968).
85. MIcH. CowIP. LAws ANN. §§ 486.251-.254 (1967). Under this statute three
commissioners appointed by the probate court determine both necessity and compensation,
and it was enacted at a time when the condemnation jury or commission decided both law
and fact.
86. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1963) provides: "Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation therefore being first made or secured in a manner
proscribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record."
Mich. Const. art. XIII, § I (1908) provided: "Private property shall not be taken by the
police nor by any corporation for public use, without the necessity therefor being first
determined and just compensation therefor being first made or secured in such manner as shall
be prescribed by law." Article XIII, section 2 provided that the jury or commissioners
determine both necessity and compensation.
87. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 516.5 (1963) provides: "'Judges of courts of record in which
condemnation precedings have been instituted shall advise the jury or commissioners on
questions of law and admissibility of evidence."
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seemingly inconsistent with its position in Detroit Edison v. Zoner,
the court ruled that the application of rule 11.2 made rule 516.5
applicable to the probate court.8 8 The court further held that the
proceeding was adversary and satisfied the court of record
requirement of the constitution and that the question of necessity
(decided by the jury under the new procedure) 9 was properly one for
court review. Under the public utilities condemnation statute and
under the 1963 Constitution, the court stated, the plaintiff was not
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, as was suggested by State
Highway Commissioner v. Drouillard.9 0 Thus, the court reasoned
that the right to trial by jury was constitutionally imposed only
insofar as it existed at common law. Since it had never existed in
Michigan condemnation cases independent of a specific
constitutional or statutory provision,9 the court held that it was not
required by the new constitution. The right to trial by jury, the court
commented, was never given absolutely in condemnation cases-the
old constitutional provision expressly provided for disposition by a
three-man commission.
The decisions discussed here represent a departure from recent
holdings which involve a mere declaration by the court that
condemnation proceedings are now adversary or a suggestion to the
trial court that the judge and the jury should begin to perform their
traditional functions." In light of these cases, practitioners may be
88. However, an easy distingishing point is that both Rules 11.2 and 516.5 (the court
of record rule) are stated in terms of the court in which a case is heard. While the pretrial
conference rule is stated in terms of the nature of the action, it underscores the reluctance-of
this same division of the court of appeals to exercise the same sort of vigor in adapting the
old statutory procedure to the new constitution in the area of pretrial conferences. A
comparison of this case with Zoner makes very plausible the suggestion that the second
division considered the objection in Zoner to be a makeweight.
89. Compare Mich. Const., art. XIII, § 2 (1908), with MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2
(1963).
90. 6 Mich. App. 605, 149 N.W.2d 903 (1967).
91, It is suggested that the absence of a jury in condemnation cases can be explained
on the basis that they were historically inquisitorial. The result of this observation, however,
is only that the legislature or the court is guilty of inconsistent judgment by not providing
for jury trials by statute or court rule if the purpose of the 1963 Constitution and court rule
516.5 were intended to make the procedure adversary in the classical sense.
92. E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Ingham County, 233 F. Supp. 544
(W.D. Mich. 1964); Gregory Marina, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 144 N.W.2d
503 (1966); State Highway Comm'r v. Gulf Oil Corp. 377 Mich. 309, 140 N.W.2d 500 (1966);
State Highway Comm'r v. Snell, 8 Mich. App. 299, 154 N.W.2d 631 (1967); State Highway
Comm'r v. Lindow, 4 Mich. App. 496, 145 N.W.2d 223 (1966); State Bd. of Educ. v. von
Zellen. I Mich. App. 147, 134 N.W.2d 828 (1965),
1970]
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
well advised to follow first the new provision of the constitution and
court rule 516.5 and only as a last resort to rely upon the
condemnation statute itself.
VII. RECIPROCAL NEGATIVE EASEMENTS
Two cases involving reciprocal negative easements (also referred
to as mutual equitable servitudes)y3 were decided during the Survey
period. In Doxtator-Nash Civic Association v. Cherry Hill
Professional Building, Inc.,94 plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering
the removal of a parking lot constructed by defendants on certain
lots (136, 137, 138, and 139) of the Doxtator & Nash Fort Dearborn
Subdivision. Plaintiffs maintained that the lots were burdened with
a reciprocal negative easement limiting their use exclusively to
residential use and claimed, inter alia, the benefit of the alleged
burden as owners of neighboring lots purportedly involved in a
general development plan with defendants' lots. The court held that,
although plaintiffs' lots may have been a part of a general
development plan, defendants' lots were never affected by the plan
and thus never burdened by the alleged use restriction.
In reaching its holding, the court first dismissed any
consideration that an expressed restriction may have been imposed
upon defendants' lots. The subdivision containing both plaintiffs'
and defendants' lots was originally platted and recorded by the
owners (Kornofskys) in 1919. Between the platting date and April
14, 1920, the Kornofskys conveyed a certain portion of the
subdivision to the Nashes, Fullers, and Whites, intermediate grantees
between the Kornofskys and plaintiffs. The record reflects no use
restrictions in this conveyance. On April 14, 1920, the Nashes,
Fullers, and Whites conveyed all or a substantial portion of their
interest in the subdivision to the Doxtators,95 also intermediate
grantees between the Kornofskys and plaintiffs. This conveyance
contained the use restriction upon which plaintiffs relied. On August
16, 1921 the Kornofskys conveyed the allegedly burdened lots (134
to 139) to defendants' precedessor in title, Ann Raffel. The
conveyance was by warranty deed "free from all encumbrances
whatever."
93. 7 G. THOMPSON. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3163 (4th ed. 1962); Annots., 144
A.L.R. 916 (1943); 60 A.L.R. 1216 (1929).
94. 12 Mich. App. 468. 163 N.W.2d 262 (1968).
95. Lots 136, 137, 138, and 139 were expressly excluded from this conveyance.
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A reciprocal negative easement will arise in the context of the
principal case if both plaintiffs' and defendants' lots were part of a
general plan of development formulated-by a common grantor
(Kornofskys). The plan must have been known, however, to the first
grantee whose lots were burdened." Conceptually, when, pursuant to
a general plan, the first grantee's lot is restricted, a similar
restriction is implied with respect to the grantor's remaining land
involved in the plan.17 The restriction is enforceable by the original
grantees and their successors of lots benefited by the plan against
grantees of the burdened lots and their successors who took title to
the lots with notice of the restriction." The notice condition may be
satisfied by actual, record or inquiry notice." There would seem to
be no dispute in Michigan or other jurisdictions that reciprocal
negative easements must originate from a common grantor.1°° For
example, in Michigan an agreement by two owners of a subdivision
to restrict the land of a third owner has been held ineffective.10° In
the principal case there is no grantor common to plaintiffs and
defendants who, pursuant to a general plan of development,
conveyed to plaintiffs' and defendants' respective predecessors in
title the burdened and benefited land in question. Plaintiffs and
96. Lanski v. Vlontealegre, 361 Mich. 44, 104 N.W.2d 772 (1960); Cook v. Bandeen,
356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959); Saari v. Silvers, 319 Mich. 591, 30 N.W.2d 286 (1948);
Denhardt v. DeRoo, 295 Mich. 223, 294 N.W. 163 (1940); Signaigo v. Regun, 234 Mich. 246,
207 N.W. 799 (1926); Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911).
97. Sandborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). See also Library
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Goosen, 229 Mich. 89, 201 N.W. 219 (1924); 7 G. THOMPSON. THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3163 (4th ed. 1962); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 916 (1943).
98. Buckley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 339 Mich. 398, 63 N.W.2d 655 (1954);
Saari v. Silvers, 319 Mich. 591, 30 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Nerrerter v. Little, 258 Mich. 462,
243 N.W. 25 (1932); French v. White Star Refining Co., 229 Mich. 474, 201 N.W. 444 (1924);
Harley v. Zack, 217 Mich. 549, 187 N.W. 533 (1922); McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302,
183 N.W. 771 (1921); cf. Denhardt v. DeRoo, 295 Mich. 223, 294 N.W. 163 (1940).
99. See cases cited in note 98 supra.
100. Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). According to Sandblorn,
the leading case, a reciprocal negative easement arises every time a person sells land which is
located close to land which he retains and he restricts the land sold to the benefit of the land re-
tained. The only safeguards placed upon such easements by Sandborn is that the restrictions
must originate from a common grantor and can never be given retroactive effect. This was later
limited somewhat by Denhardt v. DeRoo, 295 Mich. 223, 294 N.W. 163 (1940), which held
that in order to establish such a restriction where it does not appear in the title involved (such
as where a grantor who owns two lots sells one with restrictions and later one without
restrictions) the plaintiff must show a scheme of restrictions or a common plan originating
from the common grantor.
101. Gulfview Improvement Ass'n v. Uznis, 342 Mich. 128, 68 N.W.2d 785 (1955).
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defendants had a common grantor, the Kornofskys, but the
Kornofskys did not originate the general plan upon which plaintiffs
relied. The plan was developed by the Nashes, Fullers, and Whites
who were not common to defendants and formed no link in
defendant's chain of title.
A second reciprocal negative easement case decided during the
Survey period was Clark v. Murphy.02 James Murphy, as owner,
platted a subdivision of 495 lots on May 19, 1925. Thereafter, he
entered into numerous land contracts, which were unrecorded and
contained various restrictions, only one of which is particularly
relevant to the case:10 3 "Clause 4 'No building of more than two
apartments shall be erected on less than 60 feet of frontage, except
lots nos. 134, 135, 136 and 137.'" Subsequently, 69 deeds
containing clause 4, among other restrictions, were issued by James
Murphy in execution of the land contracts. Murphy died in 1934
devising all of his interest in the remaining lots in the subdivision to
his sons, of whom the defendants are heirs. The sons and their heirs
issued 354 additional deeds in the subdivision containing an amended
clause 4 which eliminated the 60 feet of frontage condition for
construction of buildings of more than two apartments and flatly
prohibited their construction. They issued an additional 72 deeds
subjecting the conveyances to restrictions of record. Defendants
owned certain lots in the subdivision which were never conveyed
away and certain lots which had been recovered through default on
the land contracts. Plaintiffs maintained that these lots were subject
to the absolute prohibition against buildings containing more than
two apartments, as provided in amended clause 4. In an
undistinguished opinion, the court held that the defendants' lots were
not burdened with a reciprocal negative easement prohibiting
structures containing more than two apartments.
The originator of the subdivision, James Murphy, adopted a
102. 16 Mich. App. 299, 167 N.W.2d 860 (1969).
103. A second restriction discussed in the case provided: "'Clause 6. That all plans of
buildings shall be first submitted to the vendors for written approval and no construction work
shall be begun until said approval had [sic] been received in writing." Id. at 300, 167 N.W.2d
at 861. An earlier clause included in the deeds issued by the common grantor provided: "For
a period of 15 years from and after this date [sometime before May 23, 1934] all plans of
buildings shall first be submitted to the parties of the first part or their successors in title for
written approval and no construction work shall be begun until said approval has been received
in writing." Id. at 301, 167 N.W.2d at 861.
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general plan of development which imposed upon his first grantees
an expressed burden to provide 60 feet of frontage for. apartment
buildings, resulting in a similar reciprocal implied restriction on all
of his remaining lots.'" This restriction would not, however, prevent
the defendants from constructing apartment buildings on the land
retained or reacquired, so long as they abided by the 60 foot frontage
requirement. Plaintiffs maintained that defendants' modification of
the original clause 4 to completely prohibit buildings of more than
two apartments coupled with the issuance of 354 additional deeds
containing the modification itself constituted a second general plan
of development, giving rise to a new reciprocal negative easement on
lands defendants held or reacquired. The court rejected this notion,
apparently upon the trial judge's factual determination that no new
plan was created.
One interesting question presented by the decision is whether the
change in restrictions by the grantor's heirs negates the original
"common plan." It is often stated that, while strict uniformity is
not required,' too many random variations in an alleged common
plan tend to negate the inference that one was intended."' 6 Although
the actions of the heirs cannot affect the original grantor's intent,
they can affect execution of the plan. The extent to which an effective
plan must be executed, however, is obscure. 07 In the no man's land
between strict uniformity and too many random variations the court
is without further guidance. Moreover, court decisions often reflect
individual attitudes on property restrictions generally.
The question might be raised as to what is the significance of a
common plan? In addition to its use as a requirement giving rise to
a reciprocal negative easement, a common plan is required by some
cases to prove that the restriction in a given deed was intended to
run with the land rather than to take the status of a personal
obligation extinguished upon subsequent transfer by the grantee.,0" A
104. See discussion in text at note 97 supra.
105. Lanski v. Montealegre, 361 Mich. 44, 104 N.W.2d 772 (1960); Allen v. City of
Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911).
106. Denhardt v. DeRoo, 295 Mich. 223, 294 N.W. 163 (1940); Kiskadden v. Berman,
244 Mich. 473, 221 N.%V. 632 (1928); 7 G. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3163
(4th ed. 1962); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1364 (1949) (omission from deed of a restrictive covenant
imposed by general plan of subdivision).
107. 7 G. THOMPSON. THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3163 (4th ed. 1962).
108, Buckley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 339 Mich. 398, 63 N.W.2d 655 (1954);
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few cases require a common plan to prove intent to restrict a lot
where it is alleged that the restriction was omitted inadvertently. 09
Some cases have cited the appearance of a common plan as a means
of giving notice to a grantee that the lot which he purchased may
be similarly restricted."0
When the common plan requirement was first proposed in
Michigan in 1909, it was interpreted by the court as a bill for the
enforcement of an equitable contract."' The systematic imposition
of these equitable restrictions grew to be called reciprocal negative
easements." 2 The court's rationale seems to have been, in part, that
grantees needed a property principle which would balance their
bargaining position with that of the grantor's. This rationale would
not appear to require that a common plan which is clearly
articulated be strictly maintained from its inception to be
enforceable against the grantor or his successors.
VIII. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Two Survey cases, Aetna Mortgage Co. v. Dembs"3 and Miller
Glass Co. v. Kushmaul,1" offer an interesting review of Michigan
statute of frauds as applied to real estate transactions. In the former
case, a prospective mortgagor of a condominium and apartment
Library Neighborhood Ass'n v. Goosen, 229 Mich. 89, 201 N.W. 219 (1924). See also Allen
v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911) (a general plan maintained from
inception and relied upon by all in interest gives rise to an easement that runs with the land);
Stott v. Avery, 156 Mich. 674, 121 N.W. 825 (1909)) (treats it like a bill to specifically enforce
an equitable contract).
109. Buckley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 339 Mich. 398, 63 N.W.2d 655 (1954);
Kiskadden v. Berman, 244 Mich. 473, 221 N.W. 632 (1928); Frink v. Hughes, 133 Mich. 63,
94 N.W. 601 (1903); Harris v. Roraback, 137 Mich. 292, 100 N.W. 391 (1904).
110. Nerrerter v.Little, 258 Mich. 462, 243 N.W. 25 (1932); French v. White Star
Refining Co., 229 Mich. 474, 201 N.-W. 444 (1924); McQuade v.Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183
N.W. 771 (1921).
111. Stott v. Avery, 156 Mich. 674, 683-84. 121 N.W. 825, 829 (1909):
We understand the bill of complaint and the brief to proceed upon the theory, not that
a binding contract was entered into between these parties which was enforceable by an
action at law, but that the representations, conduct, and actions by the defendants and
their predecessors before and since the making of the contract burdened them and their
remaining lands with an equitable obligation. ...
112. Although the landmark case of Sandborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W.
496 (1925), is often given credit for coining the phrase "reciprocal negative easement," it
originated with Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911).
113. 13 Mich. App. 686, 164 N.W.2d 771 (1968).
114. 13 Mich. App. 346, 164 N.W.2d 390 (1968).
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complex agreed in a written memorandum to pay a one percent
brokerage fee to plaintiff Aetna Mortgage Co., a mortgage broker,
to locate a willing lender. Aetna contacted Detroit Federal Savings
and Loan Association, which agreed, pursuant to an executed loan
agreement with the mortgagor, to loan the project funds. Upon
learning of the completed loan transaction, Aetna demanded a one
percent "finders fee" from Detroit Federal (which was not a party
to the written memorandum), alleging an oral agreement with
Detroit Federal for the "finders fee." The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant Detroit Federal and the
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the alleged oral
agreement violated the statute of frauds, notwithstanding full
performance by Aetna of its alleged obligation.
In Miller Glass Co. v. Kushimaul, defendant, a sole proprietor,
and his wife allegedly agreed orally in 1960 to convey all of the
property which they owned and which was being used in his business
to a corporation formed to take over the business. Elzinga &
Volkers, Inc., claimed to have purchased all of the outstanding
shares of stock of the corporation in 1966 relying upon the
representation that the property in question was an asset of the
corporation and on behalf of the corporation sought specific
performance of the alleged 1960 oral agreement. The trial court
denied summary judgment to plaintiff, and the court of appeals
remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether plaintiff
had fully performed an obligation which would remove the alleged
oral agreement to convey an interest in real property from the
statute of frauds.
Although both Aetna Mortgage Co. and Miller Glass Co.
involve the operation of the statute of frauds (and the effect of one
party's performance on the statute), the two cases are not governed
by the same operative provisions. Miller Glass Co. is governed by
the classic provision covering the sale of any interest in land,"5
whereas Aetna Mortgage is governed by the broker's commission
provision, a relatively new addition to the statute. Soon after it was
passed the broker's commission provision was given a stricter
115. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 566.107 (1967) provides: "Every contract . . . for
the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed by the party by whom the. . . sale is to be
made...."
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interpretation with respect to the effect of performance on its
operation than had been applied to its classic counterpart."' The
court in Paul v. Graham'17 noted that unlike sales contracts,
broker's commission contracts are usually the subject of suit only
after one party has fully performed. Enforcing the alleged oral
agreement on the basis that it has been fully performed on one side
would defeat the statute of frauds in every case. This rationale has
led Michigan courts to rule unanimously that once an agreement is
void under the broker's commission provision, recovery would not
be allowed under any other theory.' The Revised Judicature Act
adopts a consistent scheme by preserving specific performance relief
in cases involving part performance of agreements for the sale of an
interest in land, but providing no similar relief with respect to
agreements involving broker's commissions." 9
It is generally recognized, however, that the purpose of the
broker's commission provision is to protect a landowner against the
unfounded or fraudulent claims of brokers. As a result, most
jurisdictions have applied the provision only in the broker-landowner
setting.120 Until Aetna Mortgage, Michigan appeared to concur in
this view. In this regard, Smith v. Starke12 1 formulated a two part
116. Id.§ 566.132 provides:
In the following cases specified in this section, every agreement, contract and promise
shall be void, unless such agreement, contract or promise. or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith.
or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized ....
5. Every agreement, promise or contract to pay any commission for or upon the sale
of any interest in real estate ....
117. 193 Mich. 447, 160 N.W. 616 (1916).
118. Ekelman v. Freeman, 350 Mich. 665, 87 N.W.2d 157 (1957); Krause v. Boraks.
341 Mich. 149, 67 N.W.2d 202 (1954); Jaynes v. Petoskey, 309 Mich. 32, 14 N.W.2d 566
(1944); Mead v. Rehm, 256 Mich. 488, 239 N.W. 858 (1932); Wilcox v. Dyer-Jenison-Barry
Land Co., 217 Mich. 35, 185 N.W. 776 (1921) "Purdy v. Law. 212 Mich. 275. 180 N.W. 251
(1920); Smith v. Starke, 196 Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998 (1917); Judy v. Lentz, 6 Mich. App.
511, 149 N.W.2d 478 (1967); Gustafson v. Bud Clark, Inc., 5 Mich. App. 118, 145 N.W.2d
858 (1966).
119. MICH. CoMip. LAWS ANN. § 566.110 (1967) provides: "Nothing in this chapter
contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of the court of chancery to compel the
specific performance of agreements, in cases of part performance of such agreements."
Chapter 80 includes MICH. Co-IP. LAws ANN. §§ 566.101-.110 (1967). Chapter 81. which
contains the broker's commission statute, includes MICH. CoP. LAws ANN. §§ 566.131-
.136 (1967).
120. Cases are collected in Annots., 44 A.L.R.2d 741 (1955); 64 A.L.R. 1423 (1930).
121. 196 Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998 (1917).
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inquiry: (1) whether the disputed payment can be legitimately
characterized as a "commission" and (2) whether the legislature
could reasonably be said to have intended the provision to cover the
relationship before the court. In Smith, the court noted that because
the statute was stated in terms of "agreements" rather than in terms
of relationships, as is characteristic of broker's commission statutes
of some other states,'22 its application to commissions in connection
with real estate transactions was unlimited. This view, however, was
rejected in Thompson v. Carey's Real Estate,12 where a real estate
broker was not allowed to use the statute as a defense to his
employee's suit to enforce an oral promise to pay a commission in
connection with the sale of certain land. In spite of the unlimited
wording of the statute (the basis for the holding in Smith), the court
restricted its application to relationships which it felt that the legisla-
ture reasonably intended to regulate. Accordingly, Thompson found
the simple employer-employee relationship was not within the ambit
of the statute. This construction was later approved and applied to an
oral agreement between brokers to divide a commission.!'2 Similarly,
in Summers v. Hoffman, 1 5 where the statute was pleaded as a
defense in a suit to collect part of the proceeds from the sale of land,
the subject of a joint venture, the court noted that even though the
payment was "compensation to a factor or other agent" and thus
in the nature of a commission, the statute was inapplicable since the
parties were in a fiduciary relationship which was otherwise clearly
defined and regulated. The net effect of these case's would seem to
have limited the statute in Michigan to the apparent legislative
purpose of protecting landowners from the unfounded claims of
brokers.'12  The court in Aetna Mortgage has expanded the
122. See Annots., 44 A.L.R.2d 741 (1955); 64 A.L.R. 1423 (1930).
123. 335 Mich. 474, 56 N.W.2d 255 (1953).
124. Beznos v. Borisoff 339 Mich. 12, 62 N.W.2d 461 (1954).
125. 341 Mich. 686, 69 N.W.2d 198 (1955).
126. The legislative intent has been variously stated. Ekelman v. Freeman, 350 Mich.
665, 87 N.W.2d 157 (1957) (to protect landowners against unfounded and fraudulent claims
by brokers and also because requirement of a writing is expedient); Summers v. Hoffman, 341
Mich. 686. 69 N.W.2d 198 (1955) (that the legislature intended this statute to apply only to
agreements by an agent or broker); Thompson v. Carey's Real Estate, 335 Mich. 474, 56
N.W.2d 255 (1953) (to protect property owners from the fraudulent or unfounded claims of
brokers); Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849 (1937) (to prevent fraud);
Purdy v. Law, 212 Mich. 275, 180 N.W. 251 (1920) (parole depends for its veracity on the
memory of interested witnesses); Bagaeff v. Prokopek, 212 Mich. 265, 180 N.W. 427 (1920)
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application of the broker's commission statute, but in doing so. has
not clearly utilized the two part Sinith inquiry. Although charac-
terizing the "inders fee" as a commission would seem to be
justified, application of the statute to a mortgagee-mortgage broker
relationship in light of the purpose or the broker's commission
provision, as interpreted by Michigan decisions, is questionable.
Clearly a professional mortgagee is not as subject to the unfounded
claims of mortgage brokers as an individual landowner. .etna
Mortgage did present a fact situation closer to the conventional
landowner-broker relationship than any other nonconventional
relationship which has been before Michigan courts, a circumstance
which apparently swayed the court.
IX. CONCLUSION
Michigan appellate courts made no startling pronouncements
with respect to the law of real property during the Survey period.
For the most part traditional property concepts were unequivocally
confirmed, consistent with the courts' past practices. Some
flexibility, however, was experienced in dealing with the foreclosure
of land contracts and the allocation of charges under the landlord-
tenant relationship. In striking down a provision in the City of
Saginaw housing code, the supreme court in a questionable decision
may have created more problems than it has cured. On balance, the
body of real property law which existed in Michigan in 1968 remains
intact through 1969.
(intended to cut off method of collection, broker could procure a note for the amount of his
commission and the note would be enforceable). In Summers v. Hoffman, 341 Mich. 686, 69
N.W.2d 198 (1955). the court pointed to the fact that the rights, duties, and liabilities of joint
venturers were already well-defined as evidence that the legislature did not intend this statute
to further regulate the relationship.
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